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Editorial

SOME years ago we expressed the fear that only a small proportion of the clergy of the present generation "has read any divinity to speak of that was published before the beginning of this century".[1] The statement was not called in question at the time, and perhaps was only too well founded. But we should now be happily disposed to qualify it. For, in so far as any present trends in theological reading can be discerned, there appears to be a marked one towards a revival of interest in the Christian classics of former ages. The renewed vitality of patristic studies, which is by no means confined to experts, is an obvious case in point. We know of lay people who have been excited to find how much the writings of the Fathers speak nowadays to their condition. Again, the immense virtues of the work of St Thomas Aquinas and also of the medieval mystics are being more and more widely appreciated. And the rediscovery of the Reformers is proceeding apace.

The inauguration of a new "Library of Christian Classics" is both a symptom of this trend and a stimulus which is likely to increase it. The general theological reader, especially if he is without an easy mastery of ancient languages, has not so far been treated as generously in this century as he was in the last century. Then, at least three different series of the Fathers of the Early Church in translation were published, as well as the Parker Society's edition of the "Works of the Fathers and Early Writers of the Reformed English Church" and the "Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology", which consisted of works of our seventeenth-century divines. Of the foreign Reformers, forty-five volumes of Calvin's commentaries on Holy Scripture, in addition to his other works, were published by the Calvin Translation Society. There even appeared in 1824–6 four volumes of "Select Works of Martin Luther", whose writings have never been well known in England either to those who were supposed to admire him or to those who intended to condemn his errors.

We cannot look for such literary largesse in the present century nor, if we could, would most of us know what to do with it. And indeed most of the series to which we have alluded were produced in the interests of some single school of thought, rather than with a view to making available what the greatest Christian minds in all ages and of all types have thought and taught. "The Library of Christian Classics" is to be the outcome of Anglo-American co-operation, both in editing and in publishing. When complete, it will consist of twenty-six volumes of about 400 pages each, which will range from the Early Christian Fathers to the English Reformers. The

[1] THEOLOGY, June 1948, p. 205.

publishers in England are the S.C.M. Press, and they are having compassion on would-be possessors of the whole series by publishing only four volumes per annum—two in the spring and two in the autumn. Each volume will cost 30s., and, if the first two that have already appeared are characteristic of what is to come, there can be no question that intending purchasers will receive their money's worth. They are as noble in appearance as in content. It is indeed to be hoped that not only theological libraries but many individuals will begin at once to collect the whole series. "Preserve proportion in your reading", said Dr Arnold. "Keep your view of men and things extensive." That is more easily said than done, but the student of theology could have no better aid towards doing it than will be afforded by this series.

The two volumes already published are (i) *Early Christian Fathers*, newly translated and edited by Dr Cyril C. Richardson in collaboration with Professors E. R. Fairweather, E. R. Hardy, and M. H. Shepherd; and (ii) *Zwingli and Bullinger*, edited by Dr G. W. Bromily. The former contains the Letters of Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp, the Didache, the Letter to Diognetus, the First Apology of Justin, selections from Irenaeus, etc., all carefully edited and annotated with indexes and up-to-date bibliographies. The latter contains representative selections from the writings of Zwingli and Bullinger, also with the kind of introductory information and annotations that will be most serviceable to the general theological reader. A leaflet with details of plans for the whole series can be obtained from the S.C.M. Press.

Karl Heim on Faith and Science

An English translation of the first volume of Professor Karl Heim's six-volume work *Der Evangelische Glaube und das Denken der Gegenwart* (The Protestant Faith and Modern Thought) was published in 1935 under the title *God Transcendent*. The fourth and fifth volumes, published in German in 1949 and 1951, have recently appeared in an excellent English translation.[1] A few months ago the final sixth volume was published in German under the title *Weltschöpfung und Weltende* (The Creation and the End of the World).

A warm welcome must be given to the two volumes now available in English. The questions to which Heim addresses himself in them are of crucial importance, whether one agrees or not with the answers he gives to them.

Heim seems to have set in motion on the Continent a genuine conversation with men of science. Pascual Jordan, the eminent physicist, wrote about these volumes that "the professional physicist can only recognize with unreserved admiration the profound understanding and mastery in presentation which the representative of a discipline far removed from his own brings to the great themes of matter,

[1] *Christian Faith and Natural Science* and *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*, S.C.M. Press, 21s. each.

relativity, and causality". To be able to talk freely with scientists in their own language is a notable achievement for a theologian. If the Christian faith is to be commended to the modern world, there must be Christian thinkers who acquire the technical equipment of talking the language of science, which is the language of the majority of educated people to-day. Heim has set a stimulating example.

Heim can not only talk the language of science, but his work reveals a profound understanding of the place of science in modern life. He has felt on his pulses what Professor Herbert Butterfield means when he describes the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century as the rise of a new civilization "strange as Nineveh and Babylon". He quotes with agreement the dictum of Pascual Jordan that the age in which we are living is not one of religious or artistic fruitfulness, and that "in the outlook of modern man there is only one spiritual phenomenon characteristic of our age and at the same time of unqualified magnitude and power. Our epoch has found the authentic symbol of its inner struggle in the researches of natural science." In taking charge of his own destiny through the new powers with which science and technology have invested him man has reached adulthood. Because Heim sees so clearly the influence of science on the whole lives of men to-day and the extent to which it has moulded the intellectual face of the age, it is plain to him that if the Christian faith is to obtain a hearing it must come to terms with this tremendous force.

In the Copernican world the Christian estimate of man made good sense. But what weight can be attached to it in the face of the immensities of space and time revealed by modern knowledge? What importance can be assigned to man if humanity itself is no more than an infinitesmal grain of sand in an immeasurable sandy waste? What answer is there to the accumulating evidence of the complete dependence of the most intimate psychological processes upon physical events? What if everything that the theologian talks about is simply the effect of the reflection of conditions of the brain? For the consistent secularist, "everywhere in the world, in the realm of astronomical figures and in the narrowest domain of the protons and electrons, in the fields of physics and biology, in inorganic and organic nature, we find the same play of forces. The weaker gives way to the stronger. It has always been so and it will always be so. This primary law is obeyed throughout all spaces and throughout all times." That, Heim maintains, is the clear, overall picture of reality on the basis of which the genuine secularist conducts his life and his thinking. Religion and morality are nothing more than illusions to which men have had recourse to sustain and inspire them in the unceasing struggle for power.

Where these views about the nature of reality prevail, are communicated through education, literature, the press, and the radio to widening circles, and are consciously or unconsciously accepted, it is impossible for religion to obtain a hearing. It can seem deserving of attention only if we are able to oppose to them an overall, total view of reality in which nature and man appear in a different light.

Heim's conviction that the task is great and urgent is shown by the fact that he devotes three out of the six volumes of his major theological work to the relation between Christian faith and natural science. The question with which these volumes are concerned is not, Heim insists, a question peripheral to theology, an interesting side issue which may engage the attention of those who are attracted by such hobbies. It has to do with the foundations of belief. He believes that the history of Protestantism took an unhappy turn when, soon after the time of Schleiermacher, theology severed its connexion with philosophy and showed a growing reluctance to undertake the difficult task of opposing the world-picture of disbelief with a world-picture of belief.

There was a time when the Church could afford to concentrate its interest on its own central theme of salvation and leave everything else to the profane sciences. In the period of the Reformation the remaining part of the world-picture was merely a development of, or at least not fundamentally incompatible with, the central theme of the Christian faith. To-day it is far otherwise. The fundamental question in debate is not a particular point in the teaching of the Church, but the whole. Between the secular view of the world and the affirmations of Christianity there exists a yawning gulf. The future of the Church depends to-day more than ever on whether it withdraws into the ghetto and leaves the world to its fate, or whether it has the authority to continue a discussion with the world about the ultimate truths of life. It has to face these issues not merely for the sake of the world, but for the sake of its own members. If they are ignored, Christian faith may in a moment of crisis collapse, as the Campanile at Venice did because the piles in its foundations had become rotten and were no longer able to support the superstructure. If the question of the nature of reality remains unanswered, the whole of the disputes between religions—all the discussions and proceedings, for example, of the World Council of Churches—are simply a waste of energy. Nothing is gained from devoting time to such debates so long as no answer has been given to the question whether all such discussions are not completely remote from the truth of things as they are. Heim wants to remind theology of the true proportions of its task.

He begins by rejecting decisively the method common in Christian apologetics of starting with the supposed conclusions of contemporary science. This course is the more tempting because in the opinion of many people recent tendencies in physics create a more favourable climate for religious belief. But it would be unwise to depend on this, since there is nothing to prevent the wind from veering in a contrary direction. If we are to have a firm basis for our faith, it must be one that is independent of changing currents of scientific opinion. We must find a position which is not open to attack from the side of science, a philosophical standing-ground on which we can reach a thorough-going settlement of accounts with the ultimate presuppositions of the scientific method. We must begin by constructing a philosophic basis. This is the theme of the first of the two volumes.

The first reality which lies entirely outside the reach of scientific investigation is the reality of our own I, the knowing subject, whose existence has to be presupposed before there can be any science at all. The first datum given to us in our experience is not the contents of our sense perceptions, but our own self, assailed by the multitude of impressions and compelled to come to terms with them. It is, as Eddington said, the only place at which each one of us sees *directly* into the interior of the world. As an eminent living physicist, Dr C. F. von Weiszäcker, puts it, man is the product of nature, but natural science, our whole picture of nature, is the creation of man.

In insisting on the centrality, priority, and cruciality of the self or subject in knowledge and in life, Heim is in the stream of a long philosophical tradition. He is in line also with a powerful modern movement of protest against the subordination of life to a soulless objectivity and of insistence on the "engagement" of all thought. This tendency has been strikingly confirmed by recent developments in physics which have demonstrated the inescapable participation of the observer in knowledge.

Heim traces the course which human thought has travelled. For primitive man there is no space other than perceptual space, no reality which is not observable and corporeal. In India and among the Greeks there began a first awakening of the human mind to the possibility that existence within the observable world may perhaps not be the only form of existence and that there may be some other mode of being which differs fundamentally from it not only in its content but in its whole configuration. In both cases the philosophical systems that developed were only the intellectual expression of an existential change that had already transformed the entire personality. The emancipation from primitive ways of thinking was completed in German idealism. For Fichte the I was not a substance but, in opposition to everything objective, the non-objective subject, separated by a deep gulf from the whole of objectivity. This was a decisive turning-point in human thought, a Copernican revolution. Its significance becomes fully apparent only in the light, on the one hand, of the new thinking in mathematics and physics about the multiplicity of spaces and, on the other hand, of the attention directed by existential philosophy to the significance of the Thou. It is in this historical perspective that we have to understand what Heim is trying to say about the human situation that confronts us to-day.

Heim is convinced that "the rift between belief and natural science can to-day be bridged, and mutual comprehension established, only if it is possible to transpose the concept of space, which has acquired a position of primary significance in modern physics, in a higher sense to the world-picture of belief". The elaboration of this view fills a large place in his exposition, and one English reviewer has singled it out as a contribution of major interest. How much is gained by this extended use of the metaphor of space I am not enough of a mathematician to judge. But my doubts about the play which Heim makes with the concept of space are confirmed by philosophical friends whose competence greatly exceeds my own. In any

case the metaphor, however useful for certain purposes, does not seem to be essential to Heim's central concern, which is to show that there may exist two or more independent and all-comprehensive *fields of consciousness* or structures of reality, in which it is possible to live simultaneously, even though one may be entirely unaware of one or more of them, until one's eyes have been unexpectedly and suddenly opened to the previously unrecognized reality.[1]

The new insight which we owe to the existential philosophy is that the I, which was the great discovery of idealism, is inexorably bound by a fatal necessity to a *particular* point of time and place in the objective world. The first discovery that the thinking subject cannot be objectified goes back to Plato. The significance of the second no less important fact, that this unobjectifiable self is none the less chained to a definite position in the world of phenomena has begun to be seen clearly only in the present century. Idealism failed to recognize the importance of the Thou because it held (quite rightly) that the I, the unifying centre of all experience, can exist only in the singular. It is just when we hold firmly to this insight that we become aware of the whole paradox of the situation which arises when we encounter another person. In a world which logically has only one centre, we find actually two centres—or many millions of centres. On the far-reaching implications of the contradictions involved in the encounter with the other a good deal has been written. The important point for our present purpose is Heim's insistence on the existential fact that the sovereign self, as idealism conceived it, is inextricably tied to a particular station in the phenomenal world and consequently forced to view the world from an individual perspective. The idea of inescapable *appointment* to a station in life in all its deep theological implications is fundamental to the whole thought of these volumes.

The immense significance of the non-objective region which lies beyond the reach of the methods of investigation proper to science becomes fully clear to us only when we open our minds to the important fact that the world in which we find ourselves is not static but in a constant state of change. At every moment, in the living present, the open, undetermined, molten future is passing in a ceaseless stream into the frozen, unalterable past. In this process we participate, not passively but actively, through the exercise of our *will*, which is seen in reflection to be a particular form of existence of the I. The will belongs to the same non-objectifiable space as the I, and it is in this same space that the incessant encounters take place between the I and the Thou. But we cannot stop with the encounter between human persons. We have to ask, as Heim does in a powerfully developed argument, whether throughout the entire non-human world there may not be something which corresponds, however remotely, to what we know in our human experience as life and

[1] On Heim's views about space and other aspects of the new world-view of physics we must await the verdict of scientists. A full review of Heim's two volumes by Professor Herbert Dingle will appear in the *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*.

will—whether, when we penetrate to the ultimate secret of reality, the whole world may not be animate. To this question our limitation to the human form of experience precludes any definite answer. But the moment of time in which the undecided future passes over into the irrevocably determined past is a law to which the whole course of cosmic happenings is subject. We cross at every moment the fateful boundary between past and future in the company of innumerable beings, human and non-human, with which we are in relations of alliance or conflict as we attempt to give shape to the undetermined future. All these relations, like the existence of the I and the encounter of the I and the Thou, have their place in the non-objectifiable space.

This comprehensive survey of human experience is the necessary preparation for dealing with the second great reality which lies beyond the reach of scientific investigation. God is not, like the I, a demonstrable fact of human experience. It is not Heim's purpose here to affirm dogmatically the existence of God; that would appeal only to the small circle of those who already believe. His intention in this book is to show "in a form which is intelligible to any thinking person" that the reality of the personal God, no less than the reality of the self, "belongs to a dimension which is different from everything that is accessible to scientific investigation".

The whole of human experience that has thus far been considered is inexorably subject to the universal law of polarity: everything that exists, that is to say, is related to something else and is dependent on it. Heim forcibly brings out the tragic nature of this subjection. In the inescapable question, which faces us daily, how we shall act, we have to choose between a relativism which can question every authority, since every authority plainly rests on some earlier authority or decision, and a positivism which (in the sense in which Heim uses the term) arbitrarily fixes on a point at which to drive in a nail and hang everything on it. The consequences to which the latter choice may lead have been shown in Nazism. If this is our fundamental and inescapable dilemma, then we are ultimately concerned only with one question—the question whether the polar form of existence is the sole form of human existence. One of Heim's gifts is his capacity to distinguish what is primary and fundamental from what is secondary and derivative and never to lose sight of the distinction. Just as he sees that the major task of Christian faith in our time is to come to terms with the scientific view of the world, so he sees with unfailing clarity that the question of questions for theology is the question of God.

Unless we learn to think of the supra-polar sphere as a *space*, in the sense in which he uses that term, we shall, Heim believes, distort theological truth by expressing it in the mythological mode of primitive thinking. Only when we understand that the supra-polar sphere is a form of being as all-embracing and ever-present as our polar existence, and that one and the same event, which in the polar space is subject to temporal causation, is at the same time ordered quite otherwise in the supra-polar space, can a man with a mathematical

and scientific training, and familiar with the causal relations of natural occurrences, hold the Christian faith without compromising his intellectual conscience. Heim is not, of course, asserting that *God* is a space. He is making no titanic attempt to enmesh or master the incomprehensible. God remains the "wholly other". Heim is speaking only of the way in which God makes himself accessible, and in regard to this he maintains that unless theology avails itself of the new "thinking in spaces", it will have perforce to fall back on categories both less adequate to its purpose and less intelligible to educated men to-day.

If there is any path that leads to God it can only be from the unobservable central point of the existent I. This is of crucial practical importance. If we search in the objective space, God remains entirely invisible. When we have been awakened to the mystery of our personal existence and have come to "ourselves", we are confronted by two questions which we cannot evade. These are, Where do I come from? and What ought I to do? To the second question there is no satisfying answer unless there is laid on us an inescapable commission, an unconditional obligation, a sacred necessity, the unconditionality of which can come only from the supra-polar sphere. To the first question also, why I am bound irrevocably to this particular station in time and space, there can be no satisfying answer except that I have been *appointed* to it. I certainly did not appoint myself. If I was thrown into it by blind chance, life is without meaning. An I can receive its warrant only from an I.

The second of the two volumes is concerned with the questions which arise at the points where "science, quite involuntarily and by following its own line of thought, impinges on the region where lies the question about God". This has happened in our time in the revolutionary changes that have taken place in the physical view of the world. One after another the absolutes and certainties, which have held unquestioned sway for centuries over men's minds, affording them a quasi-religious support and security, have suffered complete collapse. The first is the belief in matter as the fundamental substance of which the world is composed—that is to say, the absolute object. The second is the absolute of the fundamental forms of space and time. The third is the absolute determination of the world-process by the universal law of causality. The significant thing is that this complete reversal of outlook has taken place as the result not of theoretical reflection but of facts of experience experimentally verified. The physicist Pascual Jordan endorses Heim's conclusions. We are shown, he says "with shattering conclusiveness that in the region of what can be apprehended by our own minds there is nothing ultimate, absolute, or finally valid". The whole of our relation to reality is fundamentally altered when the recognition is brought home to us that "the world is not separable from an observing subject".

In the concluding section of the second volume Heim turns from physics to biology to consider the riddle of life. Biological research makes it plain that the fundamental law which controls the whole

process of life is a tendency to wholeness. Heim maintains that our apprehension of these wholeness-systems and our relating of ourselves to them belong to the non-objective sphere in a way analogous to our relation to our fellow human beings.

This compressed account of the contents of these two volumes conveys little idea of the wealth and variety of the instruction, suggestion, and stimulus they contain. All the space in this article has been needed to make clear Heim's main positions. The new questionings of the foundations of modern science and of the assumptions by which mankind has in recent times steered its course open up vast issues relating to man and his future. Discussions between Christians and the scientific world are, as Heim says, of direct concern to every educated person. His volumes are among the few which can help us to find our bearings in this sea of perplexities.

The importance of the issues which Heim is raising can perhaps be seen most clearly if we contrast his view with that presented in Dr Alan Richardson's *Christian Apologetics*, which also attempts to elucidate the relation of Christian faith to modern science, has been widely acclaimed, and presumably is being extensively used in the training of ordinands. The two positions are in fundamental contradiction. If Heim is right, the guidance offered by Richardson is wide of the mark.

The latter, for example, wants to maintain that theology is an empirical science. The chapter expounding this thesis includes a section on "The Subject-matter of Theological Science", which is said to be "the study of Christian existence in history", and God is not mentioned in the section at all. Or are we meant to understand that theology and theological science are totally different things? Heim, on the contrary, who has demonstrated his respect for science by devoting a lifetime to the thorough mastery of the physical and biological sciences, insists that the two fundamental realities of the human person and of God are inaccessible to the methods of empirical science.

On the rational level Dr Richardson makes a good deal of the differences between the natural and the human or social sciences, but he appears to be unaware that behind this lies a more fundamental question. He compares the study of theology with that of physics, since "both alike are grounded upon the desire to understand better a given part of human experience", and notes that, in the former, there is an element of personal engagement which "makes impartiality or detachment more difficult to attain". He evades the question whether it is merely a matter of less or more at a single level, or whether there are not two quite different fundamental attitudes in man's relation to the world both of which are present in the activities of both the natural and the human sciences, but in varying degrees. Though he refers to theology as an "existential" science, he takes no serious account of the influential body of thought, Christian and non-Christian, which is in full agreement with Heim, that "encounter" belongs to a wholly different sphere from the objective world with which science deals; nor of the crucial difference which

Professor K. R. Popper drives home relentlessly in his *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* between fact and decision.

At the deeper theological level God is clearly not an object to be investigated by the methods of empirical science. To attempt to apprehend him in that way is to reduce him to an idol. That is something which Dr Richardson would vehemently repudiate. But what is theology about, unless it is about God? Why then try to make out that it is an empirical science? And why should a Christian theologian leave it to a non-Christian to utter, as Martin Buber does in his latest book *The Eclipse of God,* the greatly needed warning that the attempt to preserve the *idea* of the divine as the true concern of religion, while at the same time destroying the reality of God by substituting for the encounter with the living God an act of thought, which is only a self-encounter, is one of the gravest tendencies of our time? Yet this is the direction in which we are inevitably led when we try to reduce theology to the level of an empirical science. Heim sees clearly that, whatever God may be, he is no part of the objective world, and that there is consequently no road from science to religion.

Of course, when the encounters with God and fellow man, which are the chief stuff and substance of human experience, have taken place, the results are precipitated in the objective world and are as legitimate a subject of scientific study as everything else in that world. No one will question that in theological study there is a wide range of matters to be investigated by the methods of empirical science or that the study of them must be pursued with all the rigour of scientific method. What needs to be seriously asked is how far these matters have to do with living religion. If we treat these secondary consequences as the central concern of theology we are in danger of denying, or at least obscuring, not one or more single articles of the Christian creed, but something more fundamental, namely, the basic realities of human existence as apprehended in the light of the Christian revelation.

Dr Richardson is evidently acquainted with Heim's earlier volume, *God Transcendent.* But he does not seem to have grasped its fundamental challenge. The discussions in that volume led, in the view of its author, to two results "of capital importance for our whole understanding of reality". The first is "the overthrow of the sole sovereignty of the objective world-view". The whole objective sphere, with which science is concerned, is the sphere of the already-become. Nothing can ever be investigated until it has become part of the dead past.[1] The whole of the molten, undetermined, living present remains inaccessible to science. This leads to the second conclusion, that

[1] This is not, of course, a view peculiar to Heim. The Professor of History and Philosophy of Science in University College, London, for example, says: "Whatever I think about, even if it is 'just occurring', is immediately projected into the past, and I can contemplate it only when and because it is there" (Herbert Dingle, *The Scientific Adventure,* p. 176). He, that is to say, like Heim, equates the distinction between subject and object with that between present and past.

the great task awaiting us is to substitute for the static conception of reality a dynamic world-view. The spatio-temporal world of material things is not the real world. In the static determinate world which science investigates there is no place for action. To the static world-picture implied in the supremacy of the objective we must oppose the dynamic conception of Reality not as Being but as Act. If that is true, theology belongs to a dimension of life totally different from that of science, and to attempt to assimilate it as closely as possible to the latter is a move in entirely the wrong direction.

It is the deposing of the *sole* sovereignty of the objective world-view that Heim regards as one of the most significant trends of our time. His life-long immersion in scientific ways of thinking is sufficient evidence of his respect for science. He is no advocate of a flight from reason. His remark was quoted earlier that it was an evil day when theology severed its connexion with philosophy. His argument does not make the achievement of religious belief less exacting in its demands. Christian belief cannot be won or kept at lesser cost than the scientist's devotion to the discovery of truth. The Christian witness has to be borne to-day in a world that has reached adulthood. There are no short cuts to maturity. All that can be offered is the example of Christian full-grown men.

After all that has been said, the question of the scientist still remains to be answered, when he tells us that in his own field he can verify his beliefs by putting them to the test of experiment and asks why he should accept religious beliefs which are not susceptible of this kind of verification. That is a question that calls for a serious answer. On what grounds may we hold our beliefs—any beliefs? Among living thinkers few have apprehended the gravity of that question more deeply, and grappled with it more strenuously, than Professor Michael Polanyi, as his published writings show. The Gifford Lectures which he delivered recently in Aberdeen were directed largely to showing in detail that the personal element, as contrasted with impersonal objectivity which gets rid of every vestige of personal experience, enters into all knowledge. It cannot be wholly eliminated even in the exact sciences, in which ideal objectivity is the goal. His conclusion was that *all* belief is in the last resort an act of personal faith, commitment and responsibility on the part of the individual. When we reach this point the question lies very close whether responsibility can have any valid meaning unless it is responsibility to some one. Once again we seem to reach a point at which, in Heim's words, "science, involuntarily and by following its own line of thought, impinges on the region where lies the question of God".

J. H. Oldham.

The Roman Catholic Doctrine of Marriage

This article has been written at the request of a number of Anglicans who, living in parts of the country where Roman Catholic influence is very strong, are puzzled by current Roman teaching and

practice in matrimonial cases. It does not, therefore, profess to be a discussion of the whole marriage teaching of the Roman Church, but to treat only of those parts of that teaching which most impinge upon members of other churches.

Roman Catholic textbooks commonly speak of three kinds of marriage.

(*a*) Legitimate marriage. This is a marriage between two parties neither of whom is baptized. The Church may, in certain circumstances, have to pronounce upon its validity, e.g. if one or both of the parties is converted and baptized. If the marriage was contrary to any natural or divine law, as for example an incestuous union would be, it would not be held valid, but otherwise its validity would be accepted. If, however, one party alone is converted and the other gives evidence of hostility the believing partner may, by the application of the "Pauline privilege" (1 Cor. 7. 12–15), be allowed to contract a new marriage.

(*b*) Ratified marriage, *matrimonium ratum*. This is a marriage between two baptized parties which has not been consummated. It can be dissolved by the Pope if he thinks fit. In this connexion it must be noted that there is a difference between the Roman Catholic and the English civil courts in their view of consummation. The English courts regard penetration of the vagina by the male member as being the only practicable test, whereas the Roman Catholic courts insist that there must have been an emission on the part of the man into the vagina. This requirement on their part leads to the doctrine that sexual intercourse in which the man has used a contraceptive sheath does not constitute consummation, whereas intercourse in which the woman has used an occlusive pessary does.

(*c*) Ratified and consummated marriage, *matrimonium ratum et consummatum*. A marriage between two baptized persons, which has been consummated. This will be held valid and indissoluble if there was no destructive (dirimentary) impediment to it.

We must now turn to the subject of the impediments. They are of two kinds, prohibitory and dirimentary. Prohibitory impediments make a marriage without a dispensation unlawful, but do not of themselves invalidate it. The three principal prohibitory impediments are certain vows, legal relationship, and difference of religion. The first of these need not detain us further than to note that it must not be confused with the actual vows involved in the reception of major or Sacred Orders, and the making of the Religious Profession, of which more will be said later. Legal relationship arises from legal adoption, and in countries where the State makes this an impediment it is also an impediment in canon law. Usually it is a prohibitory impediment and does not annul the marriage, but if the State makes it an impediment which renders the marriage void it then has the same effect in canon law.

The impediment of difference of religion, or as it is often called mixed religion, requires more explanation. The Roman Catholic Church forbids marriage between two persons, one of whom is a Roman Catholic and the other a baptized member of some other

Church. A dispensation from this prohibition may be given if it is considered that there are good reasons for the marriage, if a guarantee is provided that all children of the union shall be baptized and brought up as Roman Catholics, if the non-Roman Catholic party promises not to try to turn the other spouse from his or her religion, and if the Roman Catholic party promises to try to convert his or her spouse to Roman Catholicism. Further, Roman Catholics are strictly forbidden to go through any religious marriage ceremony before a minister of any other Church. They may contract marriage before an officer of the State if this is necessary for the civil validity of the marriage. The prohibitions described in this paragraph do not of themselves affect the validity of the marriage if they are disregarded, but it must be recognized that they do not constitute the whole story so far as marriage between Roman Catholics and other baptized Christians is concerned. A Roman Catholic is normally bound to observe the forms laid down by his Church for the contracting of marriage, and the neglect or disregard of these, such as would be shown by marriage in a register office in this country or marriage before a priest of the Church of England, would entail the invalidity of the marriage in Roman Catholic canon law. The American writer Doheny states succinctly: "The Catholic form of marriage binds all persons baptized in the Catholic Church or converted to it from heresy or schism, whether they contract marriage with baptized or unbaptized non-Catholics."[1] On production of proof that the juridical forms required by the canons had been ignored such marriages would be summarily declared null and void by the appropriate Roman Catholic authorities.

Dirimentary impediments are those which of themselves prevent a marriage from being valid. Many of the Roman Catholic impediments of this class are similar to those recognized by English law, e.g. insanity, duress and fear, impotence, although the procedure of the English courts tends to be more strict in its application of them. Thus, it is very unlikely that an English court would have allowed a marriage which had endured for twenty years to be annulled on the grounds that it was contracted under duress, as the Roman courts did in the celebrated Marlborough case.[2] There are, however, certain of the Roman Catholic dirimentary impediments which require special mention. Roman Catholic clergy in Holy Orders (bishop, priest, deacon, and subdeacon) are obliged to celibacy and a marriage attempted by one of them would be invalid. Similarly a marriage attempted by a Religious in solemn vows would be invalid, and there are certain kinds of simple vows to which this condition is also attached.

The dirimentary impediment of disparity of worship requires somewhat fuller treatment. It applies to a marriage attempted between two persons one of whom is baptized and the other not. The baptized person must have been baptized in or, after a valid baptism,

[1] W. J. Doheny, *Canonical Procedure in Matrimonial Cases*, I, p. 1065.
[2] F. J. Sheed, *Nullity of Marriage*, pp. 63–70.

converted to the Roman Catholic Church. Such an attempted marriage is invalid without a dispensation. This impediment is to be distinguished carefully from that of difference of religion already mentioned. In its application much will obviously depend on the view taken of the validity of baptism administered outside the Roman Catholic Church. In principle the Roman Catholic requirements for the validity of baptism do not differ from those of the Church of England, but it is the opinion of competent observers that Roman Catholics, at least in certain parts of the country, are tending more and more to treat baptism administered by members of other Churches as of doubtful validity. The following quotation shows the opinion of an eminent Roman Catholic authority:

> "It is notorious that the modern tendency in non-Catholic sects is toward baptismal ceremonies that are invalid. As the disregard of all that is supernatural increases among non-Catholics, carelessness about, and intentional neglect of, ceremonial likewise grow apace. This tendency has been so marked within the past thirty years that many non-Catholic baptisms may possibly be invalid. This, however, does not mean that every non-Catholic baptism can be viewed as invalid in practical cases. But it does appear that a doubt may exist about the validity of baptisms in certain sects."[1]

The Jesuit moral theologian H. Davis, in a discussion of doubtful impediments in relation to marriage, states the principle that if the doubt concerns a fact or the divine law the impediment is to be considered as existing.[2] It is obvious that the combination of these two positions could go a long way towards enabling a Roman Catholic court to treat all mixed marriages without dispensation as null. In this connexion also it must be borne in mind that a very large proportion of the cases involving this impediment can be dealt with by the Ordinary under the summary procedure provided in canon 1990.

An important subject of difference between Roman Catholic and English matrimonial law is that of defective intention. According to Roman Catholic law and practice a marriage may be declared null if it can be established that one or both of the parties was totally ignorant of the nature of marriage as a permanent union between a man and a woman for the purpose of the procreation of children, or if one or both of them had an intention contrary to one of the essential properties or ends of marriage, or if one or both of them contracted marriage on conditions which were not subsequently fulfilled. The ignorance must be complete, and not merely a simple mistake. An intention contrary to one of the essential properties of marriage would be, for example, an intention to deny the right of intercourse, or to keep a mistress, or to seek a divorce if the marriage proved inconvenient. Conditions which have been attached from time to time to particular marriages by one or other of the parties have been that the other was not an epileptic, or was a virgin, and for the non-fulfilment of these conditions marriages have been declared null by the Roman Catholic courts. In English law an inten-

[1] W. J. Doheny, *Canonical Procedure in Matrimonial Cases*, II, p. 44.

[2] H. Davis, S.J., *Moral and Pastoral Theology* (2nd edn. revised), IV, pp. 99 f.

tion contrary to one of the properties or ends of marriage would not be allowed to invalidate the contract, as the English courts hold that the intentions of the parties are to be collected from the form of the marriage and not from any private reservation or stipulation. Certain of the provisions of the Herbert Act of 1937, e.g. that a marriage may be annulled if the wife is discovered to have been pregnant by another man at the time of the marriage, or one of the parties is suffering from incurable venereal disease at the time of the marriage, do resemble some of the conditions which have been attached to marriage by individual Roman Catholics and operated to produce the annulment of such marriages.

In general there has been a tendency on the part of the Roman Church since the Reformation to introduce stricter requirements for its own members in the matter of marriage. The provisions with regard to marriages between Roman Catholics and others are clearly designed at once to protect the Roman Church against the loss of its members through marriage and to encourage others to join it. By the addition of ecclesiastical requirements, failure to comply with which invalidates a marriage, the Roman Church has moved a long way from the principle that the constitutive element in marriage is the exchange of consents between two persons capable of giving that consent. It must, however, in justice be remembered that the matrimonial legislation of the Roman Church is designed for all the many countries in which there are Roman Catholics, and for that reason some of its provisions appear more reasonable when seen in relation to countries where State law has departed much more seriously from Christian standards than has yet happened in England.

ERIC KEMP.

Great Pastors—VII. The Curé of Ars (1786–1859)

"You have shown me the way to Ars; I will show you the way to heaven." Such was the prophecy made by M. Vianney to a shepherd boy who was directing him to the parish to which he had been appointed: which prophecy was so fulfilled that not only did the souls of his cure find heaven by his ministrations, but countless others who would come to him on pilgrimage, literally in bus-loads, year by year, till he died.

The parish of 230 souls was as contemptible as the academic record of its new pastor. "There is not much love for God in that parish; you will bring some into it," said M. Courbon, the Vicar-General. At least love of God was not lacking in the priest, although almost everything else was lacking. He was crassly illiterate, almost stupid. He was once found lighting his lamp with a banknote.

Truly Vianney was hardly fit for ordination, could pass no examination, blundered and stammered over the simplest question. He

lived in a free-thinking, revolutionary age, when keen intellectual ability was needed if a priest hoped to refute unbelief and protect the ignorant. With all difficulties considered, and the scarcity of priests in any case, it is yet hard, on the face of it, to defend the hierarchy for ordaining a young man, however pious, who could give no guarantee of having grasped the learning required in a Catholic priest.

Jean-Marie had evaded military service—a deserter *malgré lui*. His failure to report to Captain Blanchard at Lyons on 5 January 1810 was for the simple reason that he was saying his prayers in a church for so long that he forgot. When at last he reached the office it was closed and the infantry detachment gone. Later, after being left to find his own way and losing it, he fell in with a defaulter less scrupulous than himself and thus reached Les Noés, where the mayor (a farmer like Vianney's father, Matthieu) received him kindly and gave him work at Les Robins, he and Mme Fayot becoming his close friends. Once he was nearly discovered: hidden nearly suffocated in a hay-loft, he narrowly escaped death or discovery when soldiers prodded the hay with their swords. Finally John's brother François substituted himself for the defaulter (and was never heard of again) and emergence from hiding became possible.

These extraordinary permissions of Divine Providence move one to search his early life to find what most favoured the development of his sanctity.

First, obviously comes the influence of his home. Here Christian integrity flourished conspicuously. He had a devout mother and his conscientious father made him work strenuously. However great was the fiasco of his attempts at intellectual advancement at Verrières (1812–13) and at the Grand Séminaire at Lyons (1813–14), this was not due to any laziness on his part.

Vianney would probably never have exchanged the dunce's cap for the biretta had it not been for his friendship with an exceptionally forceful priest. M. Balley, Curé of Ecully (from 1803), made it his mission to discover aspirants to the priesthood and opened a school in his presbytery. Jean-Marie's mother prevailed on Matthieu to send their son to this little seminary. M. Balley remained staunch in all John's difficulties, and when ordination finally was granted took him as his *vicaire* at Ecully. Here they vied with each other in their mortification.

M. Bailey was the more ascetic for having remained true under the Terror (1793–4). Living in such times was for Jean-Marie also a searching apprenticeship for his ministry. In conditions reminiscent of the Catacombs the saint made his first Confession and Holy Communion.

We can now return to Ars. It at once became apparent to the priest that the parish, with its sparse congregations and low morals, needed a radical reformation. He set to work with puritanical fanaticism to castigate not only the oaths, blasphemies, and lasciviousness, but the very taverns and the practice of dancing. To him everything was black or white. He refused absolution right and left till he had per-

suaded folk to avoid all occasions of sin. From his own pocket he was known to have paid the fees of a dance band to remove it from the parish. He denounced working on Sundays. They were ploughing their souls into hell, he said. He certainly did not court popularity. Yet his method assuredly achieved a spiritual revolution. The Church filled up to hear ferocious "hell-fire" sermons—mixed as they were with a pleading tenderness which came from a heart full of charity. Confessional and altar were frequented as never before. Christian beneficence, patience, and restraint were so widely practised that the very atmosphere of the place seemed to breathe sanctification. Then the Curé could say: "Brethren, Ars is no longer Ars."

At great cost were these souls gained. And the pastor began to give his life for his sheep by a progressive martyrdom. Like Chaucer's parson,

> This noble ensample to his sheep he yaf,
> That first he wroghte, and afterward he taughte.

He began, as we saw, with every disadvantage: his very aspect (shabby and emaciated as he was) was unprepossessing. Yet he possessed a spiritual genius emanating from a magnetic personality. There were no sensational methods: only prayer, fasting, and love of the brethren. But there went along with these the fierce testing from fatigue and recurrent ill-health, contradiction, interruptions, provocations (even to the extent of disloyalty in a curate). When he had overcome the world and the flesh, the Devil remained to challenge him to a phenomenal struggle, lasting over thirty years, in which he seemed to conquer all the powers in hell.

From the first days of his ministry, he had been seen going to his Church by night, lantern in hand, for vigils before the tabernacle. He said his offices on his knees. His fervour at the Altar was remarkable. His whole life was a prayer. "If we love someone very much," he said, "is it necessary that we see him in order to think of him? Of course not. In like manner, if we love the good God we shall pray as naturally as we take our breath. . . . Let us often say, 'My God, have mercy on me!' Just as a child says to its mother, 'Give me your hand; give me some bread.'" "That is real faith," he said on another occasion, "when we speak to God as we could converse with a man."

"You have preached, you have prayed; but have you fasted?" said Vianney to a priest depressed by the poor results of his labours. Fasting, discipline of the senses, lack of sleep—the Curé himself took these for granted. In his last thirty years he had only two or three hours of sleep each night. His diet consisted almost entirely of mouldy boiled potatoes, a little milk, no wine. He ate his pittance standing. To these he added the mortifications of hair-shirt and iron scourge. He took the discipline with so much violence that he drew blood. He considered however that he had been excessive in his penances when he was at M. Balley's, and dissuaded others from undertaking mortification likely to impair their health and interfere with performance of necessary duties.

There is no doubt that these abnegations provided the driving force for the Curé's effectiveness as pastor and counsellor. In his love

of souls, especially of the poor and truly contrite, he was utterly *given*. It was this underlying pastoral love in his heart (Manning called it the sixth sense of a priest) which overruled the ferocity of his asceticism.

M. Vianney was deeply affected by little children. In his own way he was a brilliant catechist. He taught them to pray from the heart: "The prayers of children", he said, "go up to heaven laden with the fragrance of their innocence." He made them share in his intercessions. His promoting of the cult of the Roman child-martyr, St Philomena, is significant of his own childlike approach to his apostolate. Decent schooling came to Ars through his *Providence*. Here orphans were received and trained to an impressively high standard. Many were saved from moral degradation. He said: "The most beautiful task anyone can perform in the century in which we live is the Christian education of youth."

In matters liturgical the Curé d'Ars was somewhat ahead of his times. Sunday at Ars was so transformed as to become almost claustral in religious concentration. Week-day masses began to be more faithfully attended. It was edifying to see workmen's tools in the porch as men visited God's house before or after work. The Church was decorated with deliberate extravagance. Frequent communion was preached and came at length to be practised.

He had made his own first confession at the foot of a clock, which was prophetic of the hours he was later to spend in the confessional at Ars helping souls from all over France and beyond. For thirty years he was "imprisoned" each day for fifteen to eighteen hours. A gift of second sight aided him in penetrating hearts and converting them. Assigning light penances, he said that the rest of the penance he performed himself. His counsel was succinct and very much to the point.

All this time the attacks of the unseen powers wore him down day and night. It sounds like something from the middle ages to read of the pandemonium which broke in upon his few hours of rest. How much was summed up in his almost playful references to the *grappin* —nightmares of scampering rats and prancing steeds, shrieks and dreadful blasphemies, thunderings and shakings, which mauled his weary spirit and which others overheard besides himself. He was even flung from his bed and objects in his room were violently moved.

Four times the Curé tried in vain to resign from his work in Ars. "Oh! had I known what it means to be a priest, I should promptly have taken refuge at La Trappe," he once said publicly; upon which someone from the congregation exclaimed, "My God, what a loss that would have been!"

The escape came at last. In July 1859 he was suddenly overcome by a fever, and left his confessional for the last time. He had said not so long before: "Ah! you do not know what it is to pass from the cure of souls to the tribunal of God!" Yet, as he lay on his deathbed he could now say, "How sweet it is to die if one has lived on the cross!" A former haunting fear of death now left him, his soul had ceased to be ground between the jaws of Satan; yet a thunderstorm

broke, like hell's last protest, as he slipped away from the scene of his labours to receive his reward.

Books for further Study: Two early Lives by Abbé Alfred Monnin and by Joseph Vianney, respectively. These are criticized and further material listed in the definitive Life by Abbé Francis Trochu, which should be read. An English translation exists. There is a valuable short study by Henri Ghéon: *The Secret of the Curé d'Ars.* The essay on this saint in *Great Saints* by Dr Walter Nigg should also be read, for a Protestant estimate.

CHRISTOPHER BYRON.

Novelist of Damnation

MR GRAHAM GREENE will not, I think, mind the title I have given him; for he prefers to be damned. That is to say, in his latest four novels he seems to have a liking for characters who are "good Catholics" but damned, rather than for those who are saved but Protestant.

Now, there is a great deal of confusion about the kind of damnation that Mr Greene prefers, and this has led to some harsh and mistaken criticism. Some have pointed out that in Greene and the other Roman Catholic convert novelists (including Mr Evelyn Waugh) there is a belief that Roman Catholics are "special people", the only ones with fully developed characters; and that only they have a "sense of sin": are aware of the full extent of their sin. But this awareness of sin is at least, surely, good and Christian, whether or not it is peculiarly Roman Catholic, and one would think that the communication of it in the form of a novel was a laudable occupation. Nor can I find Mr Greene anywhere contrasting a deep Catholic sense of sin with mere Protestant moralism; though he does contrast it with humanism.

But there is an accompanying idea about Mr Greene's novels which is perhaps at the root of many objections to them. This is that the view implicit in the novels is contempt for good works: that the characters say in effect, "I need only have Catholic belief, then I may sin as I please." Evidence for this is found in the plethora of sins committed by Roman Catholics in *Brighton Rock, The Power and the Glory, The Heart of the Matter,* and *The End of the Affair.* The passions and sins (especially the sexual ones) are represented with such enthusiasm and close realism that moral readers, the unco' guid, are shocked.

This seems to me a mistaken interpretation of the content of these novels. Far from giving licence, of course, Catholic belief sets upon each character the most frightful responsibilities and guilts. When they sin they know exactly what they are doing, how important a thing it is, exactly how mortal each sin is. And this belief and the accompanying sense of sin is not chosen as a good thing; it is an unwelcome thing thrust upon people who would much rather not be Catholics. Nor are the sins willingly undertaken (except perhaps in

Brighton Rock). On the contrary, most of the characters would rather be good.

And like them Mr Greene cannot help himself; he knows men to be sinners, and must write about them as such. If literature is to be a true study of men, it must study men as they are. And we must admit that the Catholic characters are very reluctant to become aware of sin—they are forced to it. Scobie, the policeman in *The Heart of the Matter,* is at first oblivious to sin. After confession on one occasion,

> the trouble is, Scobie thought, there's nothing to absolve. The words brought no sense of relief because there was nothing to relieve. . . . It seemed to him for a moment that God was too accessible. There was no difficulty in approaching Him. . . . Looking up at the cross he thought, He even suffers in public.

But this state of mind does not seem to Mr Greene to be faith at all. The point of the story, and of all the three latest novels, is that the love of God comes in the very midst of sin and suffering, when the character seems most abandoned. "If I go down to hell, thou art there also."

More than this, the love of God comes *by means of* the sin. This is presented not as a paradox, but as inevitable cause and effect. For the sin brings guilt, and the judgment of God, that pursues until the sinner yields to the love of God. We cannot escape the love of God in one form or another. That this is the content of *The Heart of the Matter* we might guess from the fly-leaf quotation from Péguy: "Le pécheur est au coeur même de chrétienté. . . . Nul n'est aussi compétent que le pécheur en matière de chrétienté. Nul, si ce n'est le saint": the sinner is at the very heart of Christianity. . . . No one knows more than the sinner about Christianity. No one, unless it is the saint.

In his inexorable fishing for the hearts of men, God uses sins. Scobie wanted nothing else but to go on till his death in ignorance and nominal observance of Christ, quietly being a West African policeman, untroubled even by the wife for whom he felt only affection and obligation, and who had left on a long holiday. But the net of events closed, and with intricacy and accuracy the knotted plot tightened, and Scobie fell into the net of sin. Mr Greene is one of the most brilliant makers of plot in the history of the novel, and to watch God catch the policeman is a fascination in itself. There is damnation in the very story.

Scobie fell in love with Mrs Rolt, his wife returned, and by a process of minute events he was forced either to go to Communion with his wife, in a state of mortal sin, or to cause her to suffer by telling her of his adultery. If he had refused to go to Communion she would have suspected him. He loved Mrs Rolt too much to repent his adultery and go sinless to Communion, while to communicate in mortal sin was damnation. So God dragged him in, using the sinful loves to trap him. For the love for his wife was sinful also, in that it should not have prevented him from saving his soul by divulging his adultery to her.

Scobie chose damnation, and communicated rather than injure his wife. But in the very moment of damnation he was forced to God:

> "Oh God, I offer up my damnation to you, Take it. Use it for them", and was aware of the pale papery taste of his eternal sentence on the tongue.

He committed suicide, concealing it under the appearance of heart trouble. But we are not meant to take this as the final shutting of himself off from Grace: before his death Scobie thought about God and knew him as he never did before his adultery. In the sense of sin he found God. Christ was inaccessible enough then for Scobie to long for his Peace. So that in the end the priest Father Rank said: "For goodness sake, Mrs Scobie, don't imagine you—or I—know a thing about God's mercy. . . . I think, from what I saw of him, that he really loved God."

The same kind of thing happens in *The End of the Affair*. Sarah would have been ignorant of God all her life if her unhappy marriage had continued uneventfully. But adultery with Bendrix gave God his chance, and the trap was set. Sarah thought that Bendrix was killed in an air-raid, and prayed for the first time in her life: "Let him be alive, and I will believe. . . . I'll give him up for ever. Only let him be alive with a chance." She hated God but kept her promise, and gradually out of hate of him came love. And with a fearful, slow inevitability the net of salvation extended to Maurice Bendrix and other people involved in the affair. Maurice hated Sarah for giving him up, and God for being the idea that made her do so; and out of these hatreds came love: you cannot hate God unless he exists. Again the plot is an awful thing, full of the dreadful clarity of the Will of God, prevenient and far-seeing. If the plot of *The Heart of the Matter* is a net of damnation, *The End of the Affair* has one of salvation.

Evil in Mr Greene's world, then, is not a simple thing. He makes no dualistic simplification into good and evil: both are in God's hands, God uses both. If there is any false simplification it is rather the division of characters into those that believe and those who do not. And this is certainly a division that as Christians we are bound to make—up to a point. Mr Greene shows good and evil ambivalent and confused as they are in actual experience. Belief is that of sinners, of bad men. "Nul n'est aussi compétent que le pécheur en matière de chrétienté."

This kind of belief is important, perhaps specially important for our time. For we are a generation not very well aware what sinners we are. A thing that we can learn from much contemporary literature is that we are sinners and must come to God as such if we come at all. To believe is not, as we may have thought, to keep coming as a spotless lamb to him who is the only Lamb.

Instead we have to offer ourselves as we are, or we shall be offering nothing. We have to say with Scobie to Christ, "You made me what I am"; we have to offer our sinful selves, even to say "Oh God, I offer up my damnation to you." This is the kind of belief that makes

sense to us. It is the only belief that is possible for most of us, who are not saints. Most of us could only be the kind of martyr the whisky-priest was in *The Power and the Glory*: reluctant, cowardly, doubting, and desperately afraid. Yet mostly we try to be the other kind of martyr in the book: like Juan, confident and comfortably oblivious to the fact of death. Christ's sacrifice is not meant to give us that kind of victory. It is possible to learn from Mr Greene's novels some of the abandonment and humiliation of the cross.

We must remember that Mr Greene's characters do not want to be awakened to the awful glories and terrors of life. Catholic belief was not an easy thing for Scobie: if he had not been Catholic he might have taken Communion without feeling irrevocably damned; or he might even have gone away with Mrs Rolt. In either case he would probably have escaped suicide. But Mr Greene chooses to show the Roman Church at its most demanding, most inflexible; putting its flock in the most impossible moral positions.

He might say that these paradoxes, ambiguities, contradictory situations, are part of the sinful state of the world; that we cannot escape them, and the Church cannot escape enforcing its laws with whatever suffering. Yet there is no acceptance of what is inescapable. Mr Greene is incapable of the sentiment of M. Bernanos (the French writer most like him), who writes in *The Open Mind*, chap. XV, "We never make enough allowance for evil. We've got to fight it with all our strength, and endure in peace what still remains of it." In Mr Greene's novels, sin remains sin in all its gravity and guilt. His view is not really at all like Luther's, although a resemblance has been found. Luther gave the injunction, "Pecca fortiter", love God hard and sin hard. But Mr Greene's view is rather to be compared to Meister Eckhart's when he spoke of God using our sins.

Nor is there any contempt for good works in these novels. Mr Greene is a better Roman Catholic in this respect than some have thought him. Scobie falls into the toils of sin not through bad motives but through acts which are only externally wrong. Pity and sentimentality draw him into contravention of the security regulations. Also, belief in each case involves for the believer a costly sacrifice: Sarah, for instance, gives up Maurice, her lover. But she goes on loving him; the "good work" is purely external. These sacrifices are part of a bargain with God, which is a binding covenant, no matter what the motive with which it is undertaken. Looking back over her bargain with God, Sarah said to him: "I said 'let him be alive', not believing in You, and my disbelief made no difference to you. You took it into Your love and accepted it like an offering."

At this point I should part company with Mr Greene as far as the theology behind the novels is concerned. This is one of their most Roman elements, the bargain with God and the inevitable renunciation of the human love. It is to be found in many other Roman Catholic writers, for instance in Mr Evelyn Waugh's *Brideshead Revisited*, and in the plays of M. Paul Claudel.

The reason for this is the puritanism that Roman Catholicism

shares with some of the other denominations. It is hardly possible for them to have romantic love within marriage, and love tends to take its revenge by making the puritan (like Angelo in *Measure for Measure*) fall into love out of marriage. For this kind of affair the only possible end for a Roman Catholic is renunciation, which by its very nature brings the sufferer to God. M. Claudel writes somewhere that God uses a woman to break a man's pride and bring him to God. That is to say, eros has no part in the eventual Christian life, but God uses eros to bring men to agape. As Sarah with unbearable poignancy said: "For he [Bendrix] gave me so much love, and I gave him so much love, that soon there wasn't anything left when we'd finished, but You."

This is a kind of sacrifice many Christians will feel that they are not called on to make. We may well believe that there is a place for eros in the redeemed man. And we may doubt whether bargaining with God belongs to the New Covenant or to the Old. But we should be spiritually and emotionally defective if we failed to recognize that the bargains with God in Mr Greene's novels are not merely puritan escapes from the world. That is to say, the sacrifices are not easily made; the thing given up is not despised but yearned for. Like few other novels, *The Heart of the Matter* and *The End of the Affair* show how precious illicit love may be.

We are left with the feeling that it is tragic that these sacrifices should be required: that Scobie should have to give up his life and his salvation, and Sarah her lover. And that is exactly what it is: tragedy. Perhaps unintentionally, Mr Greene has written large the tragedy of the Roman Church, and of puritanism, as well as the whole tragedy of fallen life, "the pity of it".

Mr Greene has enlarged, I believe, our knowledge of the mercy of God as well as our knowledge of human nature. Through the eyes of his characters we have, indeed, a vision of a hound of damnation. The quotation which precedes *The Power and the Glory* is:

> Th' inclosure narrow'd; the sagacious power
> Of hounds and death drew nearer every hour.

But the hound is unexpectedly a messenger of mercy. The compulsion of sin is also the compulsion of salvation. Sarah's sacrifice has the late fruition after her death, of the belief engendered in her lover by reading her diary, and of a whole series of connected redemptions and cures.

The deserts through which Mr Greene's characters pass without a sign from God turn out to have been deserts of faith, not of doubt. It was when Sarah was away from Maurice that she was most present with him in love: even after her death. Out of all the hate in the book springs love, in one of the most wonderfully drawn transitions of emotion we have been privileged to witness in recent literature.

Like Scobie's and Sarah's and Maurice's, our own experience also is enlarged disastrously in reading these books. Belief is a love affair, and in it as in human love, love can spring from hate. God becomes real in the very places where we thought his existence was

contradicted: in hatred, sin, and suffering: "O God, if I could really hate you, what would that mean?" "I don't want Your peace and I don't want Your love. I wanted something very simple and very easy: I wanted Sarah for a lifetime and You took her away. With Your great schemes You ruin our happiness like a harvester ruins a mouse's nest: I hate You, God, I hate You as though You existed."

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CORRESPONDENCE

ST THOMAS MORE AND EUTHANASIA

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

The following quotation from "Suicide and Euthanasia" by the Roman Catholic theologian the Rev. G. J. MacGillivray (p. 9) rather refutes Mr Luard's assertion on p. 134 of the April issue of THEOLOGY:

"It is amusing, by the way, to find that the V.E.I.S. actually issues a leaflet in which an attempt is made to claim the authority of St Thomas More for their doctrine on the ground that he describes the inhabitants of Utopia as practising euthanasia. The writer of the leaflet evidently thinks that St Thomas means to approve of everything that he describes as taking place in that 'Land of Nowhere', whereas in the book itself St Thomas makes it perfectly clear that he does not. The writer of the leaflet himself describes the Utopia as a 'jeu d'esprit', and that is exactly what it is, a half-serious and half-jesting description of an imaginary country, in which there are some things of which the author approves, and many of which he strongly disapproves."

Yours faithfully,

HUGH SCOTT-CHARLES.

ST MARY'S CATHEDRAL,
EDINBURGH.

THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Mr Scott reproaches me with "ambiguity", "false logic", and with using "deceptively simple" argument, but I wonder whether

these controversial trenchancies are deserved. When he refers to "the hidden rock on which this discussion has foundered", he seems to me to put his finger on the real point. As I see it, Mr Scott wants to drive too large a wedge between the eternal fact of the self-oblation of our Lord and the atonement made in time. As a matter of theological analysis, this distinction is a convenient *Denkmittel*, but the usefulness of the distinction does not invalidate the equally useful synthetic process of seeing the two as intimately related in the one fact of Christ. It seems to me that where he sees ambiguity I am seeing complementaries. Only with the Incarnation does the self-oblation of the eternal Son take on the modality of sacrifice; but the sacrificial humanity is not shed at the Resurrection, it is taken up into the mystery of the divine being, the Holy Trinity.

The relationship of Christ and his christians is indeed not one of "absorption or of complete identity". Yet, if it is a real relationship, the Saviour and the saved go *together* to the Father. How else could they go? When Mr Scott says that the Church offers herself to the Father, "not in any strength of our own but in that of the living Christ", he and I are at one. I only do not want him to eliminate from the living Christ the Man of Calvary.

Yours sincerely,

H. Balmforth.

Theological College,
Ely.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Image of God in Man. By David Cairns. S.C.M. Press. 18s.

We have here a valuable monograph by the Professor of Practical Theology at Christ's College, Aberdeen, the bearer of an honoured name. In brief, it offers us a review of the biblical teaching on the *imago Dei*, a critical summary of patristic statements on the subject, a more detailed examination of the teaching of Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Brunner, and Barth, and a chapter in which the writer offers his own conclusions on debated points. By way of contemporary make-weight (perhaps rather obviously so) chapters are added on Marx and Freud, and the book ends with a stimulating essay on the dignity of man.

In his survey of the biblical evidence, the writer suggests an original and useful contrast between what he calls "the O.T. Image" and its N.T. counterpart. For the Old Testament he relies almost entirely on three passages from Genesis (1. 26–7; 5. 1–3; 9. 5–6). The last of the three references causes him the most trouble, for it clearly implies some retention of the *imago Dei* after the Fall. It stresses the seriousness of taking man's life, "for in the image of God made he him". It leaves many questions open to discussion, but the writer finds in it authority for a "universal image" even after the Fall. The New Testament exposition turns on passages like Col. 1. 13–18 (where it is Christ who is "the image of the invisible God") and Romans 8, 28 ff. where Christians are said to be destined to be "conformed to the

image of his Son". Thus, so far as man is concerned, the New Testament image is considered as a destiny made possible by the Incarnation, a destiny in which the defaced image is to be fully restored.

The author then surveys the patristic evidence, wisely taking this by subjects (e.g. "divinization") rather than wholly chronologically, and comes to closer grips with his subject in connexion with Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and the modern Continental dialectical theologians. The supremacy of Aquinas and Calvin as systematic theologians is clearly illustrated from their penetrating discussions of this one topic.

It may be profitable to sketch Professor Cairns's own conclusions, in which his debt to both Barth and Brunner and his divergences from them are made plain. Barth's later writings, the professor shows, reveal an acceptance of "the universal image", but this is interpreted in such an exclusively Christological way as to make his definition unreal and inapplicable to empirical man. Barth in fact is really interested only in the New Testament image, man's destiny as the redeemed bearer of a restored image. Professor Cairns is more attracted by two conceptions of Calvin and Brunner respectively, those of the "Relic" and the "Formal Image". He is not alarmed at these conceptions, but formulates his own conclusions as follows: (*a*) Every man is in relation to the Logos by creation, and this involves man's inevitable "confrontation" with God. He aptly quotes Augustine's remark in connexion with the created world and the Logos: "Its misfortune was not to be with him as he was with it" (p. 189). (*b*) Man's being must be thought of as *endowment*. (*c*) This endowment cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put. The self is "endowment in response". (At this point the contribution of Augustine and Aquinas, who expound the image as "power", is gratefully acknowledged.)

A final summary, given on p. 195, may be quoted. "Man is in the universal image of God because he stands in an inescapable relation of responsibility to God and man. . . . His responsibility does not change, though the form of his response may change to an almost infinite extent."

This reviewer does not feel competent to examine with close scrutiny the very detailed arguments leading to this and other conclusions. No brief review could do justice to them. A few general remarks may perhaps be allowed. What strikes the Anglican reviewer most forcibly is the fact of the book itself, and the proportionate authority attached by the writer to his various sources.

The doctrine of man has received scant attention from Anglican theologians. We have important works on the Fall by Tennant and N. P. Williams, but the neglect of the doctrine of man is remarkable. This is partly explained by the fact that most Anglican systematic theologians take the Creeds as their starting-point, and often escape the doctrine of man altogether! The two most widely used Commentaries on the Thirty-nine Articles contain no reference in the index to either "Man" or "Image", though of course they approach these subjects in dealing with Articles 9 and 10. The Doc-

trinal Commission Report of 1938, in so far as it gave any attention to this branch of theology, was interested only in the Fall. Now we have before us the works of Brunner, Barth, Niebuhr, and, we must add, Cairns. Is there an Anglican approach to this subject?

If there is, it will come to grips with its subject in a rather different way from Professor Cairns, however valuable his study is. It would not think of deducing the biblical doctrine of man purely from those passages which explicitly mention the words "image of God" (and not all of those, for 1 Cor. 11. 7 is rejected as irrelevant). With Hooker, it would look at " the main drift of Holy Scripture". It would not put the Continental Reformers in such a position of superiority over the Fathers, nor would it naturally formulate its own conclusions in terms of differences from Brunner and Barth. But this is what is being published and read to-day, and we may have to call an old world into (revived) existence, if we find it necessary to redress the balance of the new.

St John's College, Durham. R. R. Williams.

Paul. By Martin Dibelius, translated into English by Frank Clarke. Longmans. 7s. 6d.

St Paul's Gospel. By Ronald Knox. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

That Man Paul. By Edward Carpenter. Longmans. 3s.

These three books on St Paul all appeared within a couple of months. Professor Dibelius has attempted a biography of the Apostle; Mgr Knox's book is a series of addresses on various aspects of St Paul's teaching (originally delivered in Westminster Cathedral in Lent, 1950), and Canon Carpenter's aim, in what was the Bishop of London's Lent Book for 1953, was to show St Paul's life and teaching as relevant for people's study and guidance in the present day.

Dibelius' book is certainly the most important of the three. The author died in 1947, leaving the work unfinished. Professor W. G. Kümmel edited and completed the book for publication in Germany in 1949. The present English edition was translated by Frank Clarke. The highest praise that can be given to the translation is to say that except for references to "Luther's Bible" (instead of the Authorized Version) one might imagine the work was originally written in English.

Dibelius begins with a short account of men's attitudes to Paul through the centuries, not forgetting the last century; he then goes on to an account of the world in which Paul lived, and makes it clear that he was in a rather special position, being both a Jew of the Dispersion (this influenced some of his mystical and eschatological ideas), and one who had been trained in the Law at Jerusalem, and so understood the central core of the Jewish religion better than the original Galilean disciples. But the most important chapter in the book is Chapter 4, entitled "Paul turns to Christ". Here Dibelius sees Paul's conversion as something almost the opposite of an ordinary

conversion: "Paul was not 'converted' from a life of sin to a life of righteousness; one might rather say he turned from a religion of righteousness to a religion of the sinner." Paul persecuted the Christians because he thought that to proclaim as Messiah one who associated with those who largely disregarded the Law was an insult to the law-giving God of Sinai. When Paul was suddenly convinced that the Christians were right and that he as a Jew was wrong (Dibelius makes no attempt to explain this sudden change of opinion, apart from Paul's own conviction that Christ appeared to him), he threw himself just as thoroughly into their cause; and the whole subsequent story of the Gentile mission and of Paul's arguments to justify God's ways to men follows from Paul's conviction that he has been wrong in thinking that the Law was the basis of salvation. Paul's ideas did not gradually develop, they followed swiftly and logically from the one conviction that salvation had been given apart from the Law. It was the drawing of these logical conclusions from the common Christian tradition of what Jesus had done and said, that Paul regarded as peculiarly his own gospel. The rest of Dibelius' (and Kümmel's) book is a demonstration of Paul's subsequent life as a living out of these convictions.

On p. 15 of his book, Knox says: "The Evangelists were determined to tell a plain story . . . there was to be no improving the occasion, no morals drawn, no theological footnotes." Perhaps in the light of recent Gospel criticism this seems a bit naïve. But when he goes on to say that, on the contrary, Paul was not interested in the details of our Lord's life, as much as in the fact that he lived on in his mystical body, most would agree. Knox does at any rate show that Paul's teaching, despite its special emphasis, is at one with the teaching of the rest of the New Testament. These addresses have a delightful freshness, although some of Knox's ideas are rather oversubtle. Is St Paul really thinking of a baby's head, out of proportion to its body, when he speaks of "growing up into Christ who is our head" (p. 84)?

Carpenter's book is curiously uneven. Clichés and colloquialisms abound—and mixed metaphors too (pp. 71 and 91). His main point about Paul, that he *begins* with a moral struggle (conscious of the difference between "what is" and "what ought to be") is in almost complete opposition to Dibelius' ideas. The implications of the argument on p. 28 are interesting: psycho-analysis may be for the modern man what the Law was for Paul—something which shows the cause of, but cannot get rid of, a sense of guilt. On p. 94 "Romans" is an obvious error for "Corinthians".

Selwyn College,
Cambridge. E. L. Randall.

Why I am not a Roman Catholic. By Kenneth N. Ross. Mowbray. 7s. 6d.

The "Dissuasive from Popery" bids fair to become as common a form of literature in our own day as it was in the seventeenth cen-

tury. The latest example comes from the Vicar of All Saints', Margaret Street, and the significant thing about it is that it is written by the incumbent of an acknowledged Anglo-Catholic centre in London. As Mr Ross himself says: "Often in the past there has been a tenderness on the part of those Anglicans who have approximated most closely to the Roman Catholic position towards their Catholic brothers. . . . But the time has come when regard for the truth demands plain speaking." Regard for the truth and plain speaking there certainly is. The dogma of the Assumption is based on a worthless third-century legend (Chapter II), the Immaculate Conception a twelfth-century opinion rejected by the best theologians of the time (Chapter III), the cultus of the Blessed Virgin an unwholesome extravagance ("We must firmly decline the presumption of invoking Mary's goodness to avert the wrath of Jesus"—p. 43). Papal infallibility is trounced with the weapons forged by Salmon and Gore (Chapter IV), the validity of Anglican orders vindicated with the doughty assistance of Dix (Chapter V). Chapter VI exposes the disregard for truth in the practical workings of the Roman system, as seen by its treatment of Biblical criticism, its hypocritical pose in this country as the champion of the rights of *all* parents (not only Roman Catholics) to have their children educated in their own religion (with special reference to the notorious Simcox case), its monstrous insistence on conditional "baptism" of converts from Anglicanism. A concluding chapter (VII) discusses the unity of the Church, adopting N. P. Williams's theory "of the Church as consisting of two concentric circles: (*a*) the orthodox nucleus, possessing direct and complete continuity with the Church of the Apostles, and (*b*) the *penumbra, pomoerium* or fringe of Christians whose belief or Church life is in one way or another defective", and including a valuable quotation from Dr Mascall: "I think that the Roman Church is right in insisting that the Church is a visible and not an invisible body, but I think it has gone wrong in treating the Church's visibility as an organizational rather than as a sacramental one, and so in locating that unity in the organizational one of the Papacy rather than in the sacramental organ of the episcopate."

The strength of this book lies not in the originality of its arguments, but in the fact that the Vicar of All Saints', Margaret Street, uses them. They should carry weight in circles which are most exposed to attacks of Roman fever, but which would be disinclined to listen to the same arguments from Anglicans of a different stamp.

It is with the emergent picture of Anglicanism that the reviewer is less happy. There is a distinct tendency on the part of the author to "eat his cake and have it". He apparently desires to allow as pious opinions what he rejects as dogmas—the Assumption (p. 35), the Immaculate Conception, or something akin to it (p. 37 ff.: κεχαριτωμένη does not mean "full of grace", but "highly favoured"). He is apparently prepared to accept transubstantiation so long as it does not involve a *carnal* presence of Christ's flesh and blood (p. 99). But true Anglicanism rejects not only a carnal transubstantiation, but the wider implications which in practice accompany any doctrine of

transubstantiation, viz. a denial of the permanence of the full reality of the material elements, and the claim that the Real Objective Presence of Christ's Body and Blood in the sacrament is available to the Church for any other purpose than that for which Christ himself ordained and promised it—for reception in communion. One is tempted to suspect a desire, perhaps barely conscious, to use, or at least not to condemn the use of, Romanist habits of devotion and Romanist liturgical practice while rejecting Romanist theology. But it is precisely the use of the former which in certain Anglican circles has led (often almost unconsciously) to the adoption of the latter.

Lastly, the author's interpretation of the Anglican Reformation, and consequently of the nature of Anglicanism itself, is somewhat distorted. At the Reformation, the Church of England did not merely clear away medieval errors and abuses and assert a more primitive Catholicism. It also "took into its system" certain insights derived from the Reformation itself—the absolute primacy of Scripture (a principle familiar enough to the Early Fathers, but applied by the Reformers in a new way), and the doctrine of Justification by Faith alone. Consequently Anglicanism is not merely Catholicism minus papal error, but, in intention at least, a *synthesis* between Catholicism and Evangelicalism at their best.

LAMPETER. REGINALD H. FULLER.

BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY. A Philosophy and Theology of the State. By Thomas Gilby. Longmans. 25s.

This is a large-scale attempt to restate the substance of the Thomistic political theory and to proclaim its relevance for to-day.

It must be confessed that the book seems to be a splendid failure. For in spite of all the grace of style and topicality which Fr Gilby brings to his exposition, the book as a whole does not leave a clear impression. Many would prefer an exposition less dolled up and more direct; for it is difficult to resist the impression that what we are getting is something rather more than the naked truth.

We might reasonably be expected to make some effort at historic understanding of this imposing medieval intellectual edifice—stationary, immobile even, prone to accept as fundamental to human nature and society what we now see to be in fact the assumptions of a particular fusion of cultures. It found a firmer intellectual basis in the human reason than a longer perspective has led us to concede. It attempted to express in virtually scientific form, as scientific form was then understood, that which seems to us to be quite intractable to its method—that is, the passions of men in association.

We stand back and admire it. But that is not what Fr Gilby asks us to do. He asks us to concede that it is a life line in our present distress. Yet it is doubtful whether many of us will be any more likely to be impressed with this claim than with his other attempt in *Barbara Celarent* to re-establish the old sport of formal logic, which has about as much relevance to modern intellectual operations as a book of chess problems.

Having said all this and admitted that there is something which makes us uneasy in the manner of its presentation, it must be conceded that it is the only readable exposition of Thomistic political theory and practice which exists in English. But whether the fragments which remain do indeed usefully fill the twelve baskets of modernity will still remain to be proved.

"No amount of abstractions can ever reach the heart of a concrete thing", says Fr Gilby, quoting an old Thomistic tag. His own exposition cries out for it at every point. He is honest enough to admit the problem in general.

"The course of history was not to be shaped by the political ideas we are about to study. They were the last kick of a Christian culture that died almost as soon as it was born. Whatever else his value, it cannot be claimed for St Thomas that his influence on politics rivals that of a Seneca or St Augustine, Macchiavelli or Locke, Bentham or Marx."

It is a pity that Fr Gilby did not attempt to answer that question instead.

NORTHOLT. G. L. PHILLIPS.

GODFREY GOODMAN, BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER, 1583–1656. By Geoffrey Soden. S.P.C.K. (For Church Historical Society.) 42s.

It is surprising that this is the first proper study of that enigmatic figure Bishop Goodman to appear. Materials were at hand for such a study, as Fr Soden's very full handling of them shows, but perhaps historians were deterred by the prickliness of the subject.

Fr Soden has done his work very well, and has succeeded in making a piece of solid historical research most enjoyable reading. Goodman comes alive in these pages as a more attractive figure than one had hitherto supposed him. None the less, although he is always given the benefit of the doubt, Fr Soden cannot conceal the fact that the Bishop was an embittered and essentially egotistical character.

Certain aspects of the book are frankly disappointing. The blurb leads one to hope for much more unpublished Panzani material than one actually finds; indeed, there is practically nothing which adds to our knowledge of Panzani's mission beyond what has already been published by Gardiner, Dr Albion in his *Charles I and the Court of Rome*, or by the present reviewer in *Irénikon*. What does, perhaps, appear is that Panzani seems to have trusted Goodman more than one had hitherto supposed.

Goodman, as is well known, was what would to-day be called an "Anglican Papalist". This is no place to enter into an argument on that thorny subject, but it remains undeniably true that the present book would gain much in historical authority if the author had not made his own views so very obvious throughout. A series of asides about the contemporary Church of England adds nothing to our knowledge of Goodman and his times, while it is bound to raise questions as to special pleading. Indeed, Fr Soden gives the impression that he thinks Goodman the only bishop of his time having a

true faith or policy. The Laudians come off extremely badly, and even Andrewes is treated with scant respect. Laud's treatment of Goodman, as of many others, was far from ideal, but one has some sympathy with him in this case when one reads the bombardment of letters which came from his brother of Gloucester.

One important lesson one does learn from the rift between Goodman and the Laudians: The modern pro-Papal school of Anglicans cannot claim support from the body of the Caroline divines, in spite of isolated sayings by such men as Bramhall. Goodman stood very much alone, even though I question whether Mountague (whom Fr Soden justly calls the "*enfant terrible* of the Laudian revival") was so non-Papal as he is made out here.

On the vexed question whether Goodman did, in fact, make his submission to Rome, we can still find no clear answer. On Fr Soden's showing the probability is that he did not, but that he did receive the Last Sacraments at the hands of a Roman priest. The enigma will remain, and probably the last word in conjecture has been said about it.

In spite of our criticisms this is a book for which we should be grateful. It is a real addition to our knowledge of the period and, though clearly of most value to the specialist historian for whom it is designed, may be read with pleasure by anybody who has a taste for a well-written ecclesiastical biography. There is a good index and a valuable bibliography.

Paris. Henry R. T. Brandreth, O.G.S.

Bede Jarrett. By Kenneth Wykeham-George, O.P., and Gervase Mathew, O.P. Blackfriars. 12s. 6d.

Here is the life story of a ten-talent man who made faithful use of his trust in the service of our Lord and of the Dominican Order. Fr Bede Jarrett had a first-class mind, great personal charm, and that remarkable capacity for taking pains which is sometimes labelled "genius".

It was his ambition to be an "exact" scholar: exact scholarship he said was a Dominican vocation, and he would quote Leo XIII as having taught him that "the first law of history is not to tell a lie; the second is not to fear to tell the truth". His diligence was laudable, but the field of his research was limited rather by his own subconscious assumptions than by the explicit direction of authority. It is good to read of his friendship with Dr Coulton and Sir Ernest Barker and one cannot believe that he was deliberately blind to aspects of the truth other than his own; but how vivid a contrast his mind and method provide with those of his great contemporary, Baron von Hügel, to whom no reference in this book is to be found. Where von Hügel, in spite of his loyalty to the Roman Church, is often tentative and groping for the truth, Fr Jarrett seems unaware of difficulty and pursues his way untroubled by any sense of tension.

The existence of the Church of England is once referred to in this book, but was this faithful Dominican familiar with the work of

Anglican theologians—F. D. Maurice, Charles Gore, William Temple, and other sincere lovers of truth outside the Roman fold? If so, he was able without culpable loss of sincerity to discount their challenge in advance and ignore them—perhaps an enviable faculty which the majority of the same obedience share, but hard to reconcile with his own principle that "a truth is only to be sought for its own sake if man is ever to find it".

Fr Jarrett's trials were those which come with an endless daily round of correspondence and detailed administration in which he spent himself with unwearied devotion: add to these an over-full program of preaching engagements and retreats with rare intervals of recreation, and one can feel the weight of his burden and wonder less that he died so young.

The authors say "the return of the Dominicans to Oxford was without question the greatest achievement of Father Bede's provincialates". I would say it was a greater achievement still to remain so simple and unspoiled by high office and exceptional popularity that his comment on ceasing to be provincial was, "That's the end of a bad business!"

Such a man was worthy of the eloquent obituary tribute of Sir Ernest Barker in *The Times* with its closing sentence: "When I think of him as I have seen him in the habit of his Order (the white tunic girdled with a leather belt), and when I recall memories and the kindnesses of many years, I see a shining figure and a very generous soul, and the differences of our Churches seem a little thing."

"*At* London" on p. 7 and again on p. 56 is an odd solecism.

The Deanery, Windsor Castle

Eric Hamilton, Bp.

SHORTER NOTICES

Ezekiel and Alexander. By Laurence E. Browne. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

The attempt is made here to show that the whole book of Ezekiel, and therefore the prophet himself, belong to the time of Alexander the Great. The leading clue is the prophet's curious action in lying on his left side 390 days to bear the iniquity of Israel. As the forty days on his right side take us, *roundly*, from 586 to the refounding of the Jerusalem Temple in 538, so the 390 days take us, *precisely*, from the fall of Samaria in 722 to the founding of the temple on Gerizim in 332. This booklet (almost identical in size with a number of Theology, but with larger print) is devoted to following up the clue in the prophecies of Ezekiel. The chronological notes (all but three, which have to be explained on a quite different principle) and the Babylonian background of local setting and history are taken as camouflage to protect the prophet from official interference (cf. Daniel). The modern reader must therefore learn to decode. Thus the visionary character of much of the prophecies, linking them with the allegorical writings of the Apocalyptists, conceals a political reference which Prof. Browne skilfully discovers and explains *passim*.

Individual identifications achieve varying plausibility and each

should be judged separately. The flaw is in using the single clue for the interpretation of the total collection of prophecies which, on this theory, must be regarded as almost entirely the *literary* work of Ezekiel. This is to ignore the primary problem of the structure of the book and its relation to the similar structures of the books of Isaiah and Jeremiah. It is also to fail to understand the process of transmitting the prophetic tradition.

This interesting *tour de force* is to be avoided by those who, having little knowledge of the complex problems of *Ezekiel*, are insufficiently protected against its appeal.

D. R. Jones.

Religion in Human Experience. By J. R. Everett. George Allen and Unwin. 30s.

Vedanta for Modern Man. By Christopher Isherwood and others. George Allen and Unwin. 25s.

Scientism, Man and Religion. By D. R. G. Owen. Westminster Press, Philadelphia. $3.50.

Dr Owen's book, based on lectures to first-year students at Trinity College, Toronto, is a lucid exposition and criticism from a Christian standpoint of some of the rival philosophies of life which modern civilization has thrown up. He deals not only with the more obvious instances, e.g. Marxism and Freudianism, but also with the more insidious, viz. those implicit in contemporary sociology and empiricism. He does not belittle science: he sees it as revealing God's nature and activity, and is fully alive to its achievements and further potentialities for good. What he is concerned to controvert is the elevation of scientific principles to the status of quasi-religious dogmas. This substitute creed, which he calls "scientism", must not be allowed to obliterate Christianity, which, in its great doctrines, has truths to teach which are outside the range of scientific knowledge. Dr Owen has provided the intelligent general reader with a discerning piece of Christian apologetic.

The three other books are not written from a distinctly Christian point of view, but reflect a belief on the part of the authors that all religions have a common basic theme. Christianity is not dismissed: it is accepted, but not as the supreme revelation. Rather is it one of many noble quests for the truth. The truth appears to be some kind of monism, a mystical experience of the oneness of all things; and Hinduism, rather than Christianity or any of the other great monotheisms, is the most enlightening of world faiths for such a *Weltanschauung*.

Dr Everett of Columbia University has undertaken to give a general survey of the formative religious movements in the East and West. He states at the outset that his book "is not a sermon and will not serve any devotional purpose. It will, or so the author hopes, make it possible better to understand fellow human beings and the cultures they create." The range of subjects crowded into these 550

pages of large print is amazing; and still more amazing is the way in which a religion or sect is treated of in a few pages. The book shows wide and sympathetic reading; but one wonders how far it simply skims the surface, and how far the author is critical enough of his own presuppositions. Does it enlighten the reader so very much to be told at the end that "the great lesson of our religious past is that by studying the Bible, the Vedas, the Buddhist Sutras, the Torah, and the lives of saints and seers we can discover new spiritual truth. . . . Those who have been religiously great, Jesus and Gotama to name only two, were great because they had wisdom enough to read the past and courage enough to face the future"? This kind of religious humanism ignores the differences between religions; and it answers only two questions asked by the liberal epoch of the last century. Modern man is searching for stronger meat. This is not to say that the book is without merit. As a source of concise information it is admirable; and its illustrations add considerably to its interest.

Vedanta for Modern Man consists of over sixty essays by a number of eastern and western adepts of or sympathizers (amongst them Aldous Huxley, Professor Radhakrishnan and Gerald Heard) with Vedanta, the basic philosophy of Hinduism and its derivative religions. It was sponsored by the Vedanta Society of Southern California, and appears to have a missionary purpose in inviting readers to interest themselves in the Ramakrishna order, a religious movement founded in the last century with the aim of bringing about a *rapprochement* between Eastern monism and Western philosophy, then predominantly idealist, and of teaching the basic identity of all true religions. This book is a bewildering *mélange* of the profound and the vague; and the essays are of unequal merit. It does, however, give the occidental reader some insight into the philosophical substance of Hinduism by leaving aside its oriental accidence.

University College of North Wales, Bangor. D. W. Gundry.

The Explanatio Symboli ad Initiandos. By the late Dom R. H. Connolly. (Texts and Studies, Vol. X.) C.U.P. 10s.

Made available thanks to Dr J. H. Srawley and Dom B. C. Butler, this tidy volume comprises four chapters. Chapter 1, a comparative estimate of the three available MSS, soon introduces one main conclusion, that the "Symbol" involved was the old Roman creed (as one MS fairly clearly indicates) and not the fuller and later "Apostles' Creed" familiar to us (phrases of which appear in the other two MSS). This is well borne out in the critical text and notes of chapter 2, and in further notes appended to the translation in chapter 3. (The "inserted" credal phrases would have been better relegated altogether to the critical notes, rather than bracketed in the text.) The many textual judgments involved in chapter 2 give little cause for quarrel, though necessarily personal in some instances (but query sec. 7, ll. 8–9). In the translation, to render "seriem" (sec. 3, l. 2) by "content" rather than "extent" seems almost a hyper-Ambrosianism;

and the attachment of "solus" to "suscepit" rather than to "filius dei" (sec. 5, l. 2) seems strained, especially in view of "solus et verus Deus filius" quoted from Ambrose, *De Fide* V. 32 on p. 16, l. 10. Otherwise accuracy is unexceptionable, and style represents the character of the original, a report taken down from an address to baptizands. Chapter 4 strengthens the argument from notes in chapters 2 and 3 justifying the sub-title to this edition, viz. "A Work of St Ambrose" (which was also Caspari's earlier view). The strong links with Ambrose's *De Fide* and also with *De Sacramentis* add force to recent claims (including Connolly's) that the latter, too, is definitely Ambrosian.

St Aidan's College, Birkenhead. John C. Sladden.

Dereham: The Biography of a Country Town. By Noel Boston and Eric Puddy. G. Arthur Coleby. 15s.

Padre and Doctor—a happy combination more and more found to-day in matters spiritual and material. Here we have it combined by vicar and bachelor of medicine in the history of an ancient town. It starts with neolithic man (2300–1900 B.C.) and deals with Saxons, Danes, Normans, and is specially interesting about the Elizabethans, the seventeenth century, and the agricultural revolution. Victorian activities are not neglected. Ecclesiastical history is closely connected with the great cathedral abbey of Ely, which owned large estates, and of course with the parish church, which, as Sir Alfred Clapham's plan shows, includes Norman fragments and much of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. Towers have a special dignity, for there are two, the medieval central tower and the separate bell tower, added early in the sixteenth century. The font was erected in 1468, and has fine carved panels, illustrating the Crucifixion, Baptism, Confirmation, Confession, the Mass, Ordination, Marriage, Holy Unction. The fine brass eagle lectern is of about the same date.

Of literary men who have lived at Dereham in the past, the best known are Sir John Fenn, the historian, William Cowper, the poet and hymn writer, and George Borrow, the author of *Lavengro* and *The Bible in Spain*. Mr R. H. Mottram, the distinguished modern novelist, was at one time stationed here and regularly attends the Cowper dinners.

Most of the illustrations are by Dr Puddy and greatly help to enrich the book, on whose publication we cordially congratulate the gifted authors and the printer and publisher.

Windsor. D. H. S. Cravage.

Paradox and Nirvana. By Robert Lawson Slater. Universtiy of Chicago Press and Camb. Univ. Press. 30s.

Dr Slater, now Professor of Systematic Theology at McGill University and formerly Lecturer in Logic and the Philosophy of Religion at Rangoon University, argues that the method of paradox is inevitable as the intellectual preservation of any profound religion,

that it is not confined to or even peculiarly typical of, "the Judaea-Christian tradition", and that the concept of Nirvana, customarily misunderstood by Western writers on comparative religion, is a paradoxical concept. "Nibbāna (Nirvana), then, is Mystery, but it is nevertheless the concept which completes faith and inspires conduct. Agnosticism is here, but it belongs to faith, not to doubt; it is joined with affirmation, not with negation. Every invocation, every blessing, every devotion ends with Nibbāna, as does life itself. No gaudy heaven, however attractive, can take the place of the Great Peace" (p. 47).

The book should compel the revision of conventional ideas about Buddhism, especially Burmese Buddhism; and those of us who are accustomed to contrast Christianity with Marxism on the one hand and "pure Buddhism" on the other may learn caution. It is also a pleasure to encounter a work on comparative religion which evidences awareness of work in other departments of theology and philosophy.

David M. Paton.
Birmingham.

Agape and Eros. By Anders Nygren. Authorized translation by Philip S. Watson. S.P.C.K. 35s.

It is satisfactory to know that this important book is again available. Previously the English translation was in three volumes, and was to some extent abridged. We now have a complete text, in a single volume, and one translator. *Agape and Eros* is one of the few books that has made an almost universal mark on contemporary theology. It was reviewed at length in this journal: October 1932, pp. 181–6, and April 1939, pp. 306–9.

Puzzled Parents. 1s. Where did I Come From? 6d. The Start of a Family. 9d. How a Family Begins. 9d. Science and You. 1s. Sorting Things Out. 9d. The Christian View of Sex. 1s. All by Hugh C. Warner. S.C.M. Press.

There is in this series of short pamphlets on sex one for all ages —children, adolescents, and parents. I have no hesitation in strongly recommending all seven pamphlets, especially for the use of priests, teachers, and parents. As a more or less puzzled parent myself, I found them most helpful.

Canon Warner's approach is strictly Christian and strictly scientific. He goes into considerable detail on all the technical aspects of sex, and the words used to describe the various parts and functions of the human body are always the correct scientific terms. But although the matter is complicated, the manner of telling is simple and straightforward, and he does not shirk any of those issues which parents are apt to find particularly difficult and perplexing.

But with all his science, Canon Warner is careful not to make men and women into mere scientific animals. "With children of this age (11–12), where do we begin?" he asks. "Not, I suggest, with a descrip-

tion of the private life of the amoeba and the hydra. What a child wants to know are things about humans. . . ." How many of us have explained all about bees and birds to our offspring and have then been quite unable to take the next step? Canon Warner, more wisely, tells the human story for human beings, who are not mere products of an amoral "nature", but moral beings having a soul as well as a body, and born to an eternal destiny.

From explanations of the facts of life for children of all ages, we pass to pamphlets on courtship, engagement, and marriage. With regard to monogamy, chastity, and trial marriage, Canon Warner says quite frankly that as a guide for our conduct we must accept the Christian hypotheses, about which he does not propose to argue. He does, however, give a number of cogent reasons in support of the Christian code which could well commend themselves to thinking non-Christians. "The Christian view claims to be the true one because it is truest to the deepest demands which human nature makes on life", he concludes.

This conclusion is also Canon Warner's starting-point, the basis for his whole approach to sex, and it is just this approach which makes all his pamphlets so valuable. For parents, too, I should like to underline one of his sentences—"From the start help your child more by your attitude than by anything you say. . . ." Correct knowledge, adequate information, are important, but the right approach is infinitely more important; without it knowledge can be as dangerous as, perhaps more dangerous than, ignorance. Paradoxically, the greatest benefit which parents can bestow upon their children is to achieve complete happiness in their own marriage.

We are just beginning to wake up to the disastrous effects in terms of spoiled and ruined human relationships of the Church's neglect of a positive teaching about marriage as being something higher than "a remedy against fornication". Centuries of morbid over-emphasis upon the value of celibacy and virginity have made even good men feel that somehow the married state is only a second-best, and that sex is something which stands in the way of man's service to God. Canon Warner's pamphlets are an invaluable contribution to the work of laying better and more truly Christian foundations for the families of the future.

LONDON. DIANA COLLINS.

CARTWRIGHTIANA. By Albert Peel and L. H. Carlson. Allen and Unwin. 25s.

The gravity of the loss sustained by English scholarship in the premature death of Dr Albert Peel is emphasized by the appearance of this first of seven projected volumes of Elizabethan Nonconformist Texts, upon the preparation of which he had been engaged during the last years of his life. His death indeed extinguishes finally the hopes long cherished by ecclesiastical historians of the publication from his pen of a definitive History of Elizabethan Puritanism, foreshadowed more than thirty years ago, but never completed. Instead

we must be content with these volumes of source-materials in which the chief works of the Fathers of English Nonconformity will be made available for students.

The present volume is devoted to certain writings of Thomas Cartwright, the father of Elizabethan Presbyterianism, and represents chiefly the attitude of his later years; when he was drawing further away from the Separatists and therefore nearer to the established Church. Some of these items have not been printed before; and some indeed not previously identified as coming from Cartwright. Their publication therefore is a considerable service to the historian of the sixteenth century. Amongst the most important is that which leads off, Cartwright's examination in 1590 and the question of the Ex-officio Oath; and which prints Archbishop Whitgift's interrogatories and Cartwright's replies. Here are set forth Cartwright's grounds of refusal to submit to examination according to the procedure of the prerogative courts, and his general attitude towards the Oath. Two items relate to the period of Cartwright's residence abroad, being letters sent to correspondents in England. Others are family documents, one of which indicates the sixteenth-century view of the position and place of women in society. A treatise on The Holy Exercise of a True Fast is now identified as from the hand of Cartwright; and the volume concludes with items which may probably, but not assuredly, be ascribed also to his authorship.

It is evident that this is a book for professed students of church history; and this circumstance is emphasized by the decision of Dr Peel and Professor Carlson to print their documents faithfully according to the sixteenth-century spelling and contractions. Both editors are to be congratulated on the publication of this first-fruits of the corpus of Fathers of Nonconformity. The student will wait with eager anticipation for the further promised volumes, which, when completed, will provide the materials for some future Daniel Neal to undertake the writing of the narrative history which Dr Peel had hoped to do, but which must now be handed to a younger generation of Free Church scholars.

CAMBRIDGE. NORMAN SYKES.

THE MISSIONARY FACTOR IN EAST AFRICA. By Roland Oliver. Longmans. Cloth 17s. 6d., paper 12s. 6d.

Except for a historian (and there are all too few) versed in the development of Church and State in East Africa, the publisher's blurb is all that is needed to recommend this book. "The story presented is", indeed, "powerful and exciting". The initial quotation from William Temple—"the only purely spiritual phenomena are good intentions, and we all know what portion of the universe is paved with them"—suggests an unfavourable attitude to the missionary achievement and Mr Oliver admits that "in an earlier draft . . . I wrote at length upon the social maladjustments caused by missionary work". But he is a convinced Christian (otherwise his estimate might well have been less favourable) and "after seeing the

modern East Africa I felt obliged to omit much that seemed of very transitory importance and to include instead some outline of what appeared to be the abiding reality of the African Church". The book is, in fact, the story of how even the pietist missions found themselves involved not only in advancing the mental and material well-being of Africans but—of more startling importance—in pushing the European governments, often against the advice of their political agents, into imperialist expansion to meet the growing threat not primarily of Islam as such but of the political ambitions of the slave-trading Arabs. Later it was Dr J. H. Oldham, then at Edinburgh House, who played the central role in determining the policy that East Africa was to be governed not for the settlers but for the indigenous inhabitants—and in bringing about active co-operation between government and missions in education. To-day, with the constant rumble of *apartheid* to the south and the menace of Central African Federation on her immediate borders, the political future of East Africa is perhaps even more gloomy than in the days of the Arab invasion. Where is the prophet who can show to the Church the lesson of Mr Oliver's history?

KAMPALA. F. B. WELBOURN.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ABINGDON-COKESBURY PRESS: Emile Cailliet, *The Christian Approach to Culture* ($3.75).

BEREAN PRESS (BIRMINGHAM): H. H. Farmer, *The Bible and Preaching* [Joseph Smith Memorial Lecture] (2s.).

ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK: Anton Fridrichsen (and others), *The Root of the Vine* (16s.).

JAMES CLARKE AND CO.: Pierre Ch. Marcel, *The Biblical Doctrine of Infant Baptism* (15s.).

CLONMORE AND REYNOLDS: J. G. McGarry, *Sermon Notes on the Sunday Gospels* (15s.); James Broderick, S.J., *Our Lord's Words from the Cross* (2s.).

DUCKWORTH: Robert S. Franks, *The Doctrine of the Trinity* (8s. 6d.).

EDITIONS DE CHEVETOGNE: Roger Aubert, *Problèmes de l'Unité Chrétienne* (210 frs.).

HUTCHINSON'S UNIVERSITY LIBRARY: Israel Mattuck, *Jewish Ethics* (8s. 6d.).

LONGMANS: Dom Mark Pontifex and Dom Illtyd Trethowan, *The Meaning of Existence* (12s. 6d.).

PRESSES UNIVERSITAIRES DE FRANCE: André Benoit, *Le Baptême Chrétien au second siècle: la théologie des pères* (1,000 frs.).

SHEED AND WARD: F. J. Sheed, *Society and Sanity* (10s. 6d.).

S.C.M. PRESS: Anthony and Miriam Hanson, *The Book of Job* (7s. 6d.); Colin Dunlop, *Anglican Public Worship* (7s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: Alan Ecclestone, *The Parish Meeting at Work* (2s. 6d.); Peter Winckworth, *A Verification of the Faculty Jurisdiction* (5s.); G. L. Prestige, *The Gift of Bishopric* (2s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K. (INDIA): *A Proposed Prayer Book* [authorized by the Episcopal Synod of the Church of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon in 1951] (6s.).

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